Contract Negotiation | Tribunus Health + Specialty Physician Group

The money that goes missing after the contract is signed

430,000+ paid claim lines tested against contracted rates

$360,852 per year in recurring revenue at risk

$236,445 recovered on one underpayment

Situation

A specialty physician group with fourteen clinic locations in one metropolitan market renegotiated the four payer agreements that carry the bulk of its revenue. All four were signed. All four were paying. A claim-level verification of each found more than $360,000 / year that was not arriving, and recovered $236,445 on an underpayment that had been running for nineteen months.

The group runs fourteen clinic locations in a single metropolitan market under one tax ID. Four payers account for the bulk of its revenue, and within twelve months all four of those agreements were renegotiated or amended. Each was signed, loaded by the payer, and began paying.

Tribunus then tested every paid claim line against what each contract actually said the group was owed: more than 430,000 lines, across multiple localities, provider levels and product lines.

All four payers were paying. Every one of them was paying something other than what the practice was entitled to, and no two for the same reason.

  • 4 agreements verified, claim line by claim line
  • 430,000+ paid lines tested against contracted rates
  • $360,852 in recurring revenue at risk per year
  • $236,445 recovered on one historical underpayment

The Four Findings

Four unrelated problems, one of which was no problem at all.

Payer A: National Commercial Carrier

The rates were correct, and the agreement was worth more than the model said.

Every testable code paid the contracted rate to the penny, and 96% of paid lines priced off this agreement. For this payer, the verification confirmed the contract was loaded correctly.

It also showed the agreement was worth $48,108 a year more than projected, about 32% above the model, even though total units fell 3% over the period. The change came from the mix of services. The practice did less of the one service whose rate the new deal cut, and more of the services whose rates it raised.

Annual value of the agreement: model versus verifiedWaterfall chart. The model projected $149,240 a year. Less of the cut service added $30,669, more of the raised services added $23,812, and other movement subtracted $6,373, for an actual worth of $197,347 a year.Annual value of the agreement: model vs. verified$0$50K$100K$150K$200K$149,240What themodel said+$30,669Less of thecut service+$23,812More of theraised ones−$6,373Othermovement$197,347What it isactually worth

+$48,108 per year above what the model projected, on 3% fewer units.

Why an upside finding is worth as much as a recovery

  • It is a management signal. The practice was drifting toward its better-paying work by accident. Once you know which services an agreement rewards, scheduling, capacity and recruitment become deliberate choices.
  • Compensation and partner distributions run off collections. A group planning against a number that is $48,108 light every year is under-accruing physician compensation and under-distributing to its partners.
  • It is the baseline for the next negotiation. A practice needs an audited, claim-level account of what an agreement delivered to argue for a better rate in three years. The payer will arrive with its own numbers.

Payer B: Regional Blues plan

One code, one provider level, priced against the wrong locality

The group’s highest-volume injectable code was being priced against a neighboring locality’s allowance, for physicians only, at one set of sites. Every other code at those same sites priced on the correct locality between 94% and 99% of the time. This one did so on 2.6% of lines.

That gap points to a rate-row loading error. Advanced practice lines on the same code at the same sites priced correctly throughout. The error had been running silently for nine months when it was found.

On the affected code, the payer paid about 8% under the contract rate for PPO ($15.85 paid, $17.23 allowed) and about 6% under for HMO ($14.58 paid, $15.51 allowed).

Rate per unit on the affected code, physician levelGrouped bar chart. PPO: contract allowed $17.23, payer paid $15.85. HMO: contract allowed $15.51, payer paid $14.58.Rate per unit on the affected code, physician levelWhat the contract allowedWhat the payer paid$0$5$10$15$20$17.23$15.85PPO$15.51$14.58HMO

$111,652 per year in recurring shortfall, with $56,899 already accrued across 1,517 paid lines at the point of discovery.

Payer C: National managed care organization

A billing change that pre-dated the renegotiation was quietly costing six figures a year

The contract loaded correctly at every rate tested. The shortfall came from a change in how the practice submitted claims on its highest-volume code, and that change pre-dated the renegotiation by more than a year.

Nothing in the practice’s own reporting had flagged it in all that time, because the claims were being paid. They were not paid at the rate the volume warranted. Finding it was not part of the brief. It surfaced when somebody finally put paid claims next to contracted rates.

The shortfall recurs. It is $220,955 leaking every year, across all five of the payer’s product lines, on 57,201 units.

Annual shortfall by product lineBar chart of the annual shortfall by product line: Commercial $109K, Managed Medicaid $78K, Medicare Advantage $18K, Exchange $12K, Out of region $4K.Annual shortfall by product line$0$25K$50K$75K$100K$125K$109KCommercial$78KManagedMedicaid$18KMedicareAdvantage$12KExchange$4KOut ofregion

$220,955 per year recurring across every product line, on 57,201 units a year.

The same work also surfaced $1,169,806 in open insurance receivables on that code, 98% of it sitting on lines the payer had never assigned an allowed amount. Worth working, and secondary to the recurring number above.

Payer D: National carrier

A single phrase in the rate exhibit led to nineteen months of underpayment

The reason was in the contract the whole time. The rate exhibit priced the code at a flat amount, โ€œonce per unique code per service date.โ€ The payer adjudicated that literally: one unit paid, however many were billed. On a date carrying seventy units, the practice was paid for one.

Nobody caught it at signature, because a rate sheet reads like a rate sheet. It becomes visible only when paid claims are set next to contracted rates, which is what the verification does.

Tribunus found it in the claims and put the measurement in front of the payer. The payer conceded and corrected $236,445 across 836 claims.

One date of service, by units billedGrouped bar chart. At 10 units the contract allowed $67.50 and the payer paid $6.75. At 40 units the contract allowed $270.00 and the payer paid $6.75. At 70 units the contract allowed $472.50 and the payer paid $6.75.One date of service, by units billedWhat the contract allowedWhat the payer paid$0$100$200$300$400$500$67.50$6.7510 units$270.00$6.7540 units$472.50$6.7570 units

$236,445 recovered across 836 claims, on an underpayment that had run nineteen months.

Across the four agreements: $360,852 per year in recurring revenue at risk, $236,445 recovered on a historical underpayment, and $1,169,806 in receivables surfaced for working. Two of the four matters remain open, so the recurring figures are identified and entitled amounts, and they are not collections.

Why None of It Was Visible From Inside the Practice

A short payment and a correct payment look identical on a bank statement.

A practice sees money arrive. It does not see the rate that should have been applied. A payment that is 12% light looks exactly like a payment. There is no alert, no rejection, and no line on any report that reads โ€œthis claim paid on the wrong fee schedule.โ€

Each of these required the executed contract, the dated fee schedules, the underlying rate bases and every paid claim line, reconciled against one another. No practice management system produces that report.

Consider what each finding would have required the practice to notice unaided:

  • Payer A: That its own case mix had moved far enough to make the new agreement worth a third more than anyone had projected, on falling volume.
  • Payer B: That one provider level, at one set of sites, on one code, was priced against a neighboring locality, while every other code at those same sites priced correctly.
  • Payer C: That a billing change made more than a year before the renegotiation was quietly costing six figures a year on its largest code.
  • Payer D: That a single phrase in a rate exhibit had turned a per-unit code into a per-date one.

The Clock Runs Against the Practice

Filing and correction windows close quietly, and they close on the practice’s money. Findings have expiry dates, and the deadlines sit in the payer’s contract.

  • Payer C allows 90 days from date of service to file, and 12 months from initial processing to correct. Of the receivables surfaced on a single code, $411,914 was already past 180 days when it was found.
  • Payer D allows 12 months from receipt of payment, after which the payment is โ€œconsidered full and final.โ€ The base contract said 180 days. Only the state compliance addendum said 12 months, and the addendum prevails. An underpayment allowed to run nineteen months has, by definition, aged part of itself out of reach.

Revenue found late may be out of reach. A verification run at six months and then each quarter catches these issues inside their windows. A verification that starts only after somebody grows suspicious often lands outside them.

What It Takes

For a contract Tribunus negotiated, the practice sends one file. The effort on the practice’s side is small, and smaller still where Tribunus ran the negotiation.

If we negotiated the contract, we already have most of what we need

We hold the executed agreement and both fee schedules, old and new, because we built the deal from them. The only new item is current payment data: a claim-level remittance and utilization extract, with the widest date range the system will give.

For an agreement someone else negotiated, add two items: the executed contract with all of its appendices and addenda, and the expiring fee schedule.

That is the whole ask of the practice’s team. Everything after it is ours: deriving the rate bases, testing every paid line against every rate that could apply to it, reconciling the model against what the payer actually paid, and producing both a findings document and a live workbook the practice’s own finance team can audit line by line.

The Cadence That Works

  • 45 days: Load check
  • 6 months: Full verification
  • Quarterly: Re-audit through the next renegotiation

The four verifications summarized here were completed over nine days.

Provider Type

Specialty Physician Group

Specialty

Specialty care

Solutions

  • Contract Negotiation
  • Growth Strategy

Location

One metropolitan market

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